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This paper examines the phenomenon of real-income stagnation (in which real-income 
growth is uninterruptedly negligible or negative for a sizable sequence of years). We 
analyze data for four decades from a large cross-section of countries. Real income 
stagnation is a conceptually distinct phenomenon from low average growth and other 
features of the growth sequence that have been previously considered. We find that real 
income stagnation has affected a significant number of countries (103 out of 168), and 
resulted in substantial income loss. Countries that suffered spells of real income 
stagnation were more likely to be poor, in Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa, conflict 
ridden and dependent on primary commodity exports. Stagnation is also very likely to 
persist over time. Countries that were afflicted with stagnation in the 1960s had a 
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The literature on the determinants of average real income growth is vast. However, until 
recently little attention has been paid to characterizing or explaining the qualitative 
features of the income or growth sequence (going beyond averages). There is a 
burgeoning interest in understanding patterns (as opposed to average levels) of economic 
growth. Examples include Ben-David and Papell (1998) (who attempt to identify 
structural breaks in the income series between 1950 and 1990 in a cross section of 
countries) and Pritchett (2000) (which analyzes the instability and volatility of growth 
rates). Rodrik (1999) considers “growth collapses” and concludes that countries that are 
conflict-ridden and have weak institutions of conflict-management have experienced the 
sharpest income downturns.  More recently, patterns of “growth acceleration” have been 
studied by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005), who find that growth acceleration 
episodes are not well predicted by standard growth determinants or by the occurrence of 
economic reforms.   
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two main ways. Firstly, it describes 
patterns of growth in an innovative way.  Specifically, the paper identifies and describes 
episodes of sustained negligible or negative income growth, which we refer to as 
stagnation spells.  We discuss the conceptual difference between real income stagnation 
spells and other concepts concerning the pattern of economic growth. Secondly, the 
paper aims to identify the factors disposing countries to stagnation.  
 
We find that real income stagnation has affected a significant number of countries (103 
out of 168). Countries that suffered spells of real income stagnation are found more 
likely to be poor, in Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa, conflict ridden and dependent 
on primary commodity exports. Stagnation is also found very likely to persist over time. 
 
The study of growth patterns is driven by two main motivations, one explanatory and 
the other normative, both of which underpin our work. The explanatory motive is to 
analyze patterns of real income growth in order better to understand the process of 
economic growth. The normative motive is to determine whether and how distinct 
welfare assessments should be made of different income streams (and associated growth 
patterns).  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II defines stagnation, 
describes the conceptual difference between stagnation and low average growth, that 
between stagnation spells and other features of the growth sequence, and discusses the 
welfare implications of different stagnation experiences. In Section III we describe 
features of the stagnation experience in a large cross-section of countries between 1960 
and 2001. Section IV investigates the factors associated with stagnation. Section V 




| 1 | WHAT IS STAGNATION? 
 
Identifying and explaining stagnation may in principle require a distinct approach than 
does identifying and explaining the causes of poor growth experience as such.  The 
reason is that stagnation spells are concentrated periods of negligible or negative growth.  
An uninterrupted sequence of poor growth years constitutes a stagnation spell.  In this 
section of the paper, we begin by formalizing the concept of stagnation.  Thereafter, we 
discuss the conceptual difference between stagnation and low average growth. Finally, we 
discuss whether the occurrence of stagnation spells should influence our judgments 
concerning the welfare experienced by different countries.  
   
 
Identifying Spells of Stagnation 
We use time-series data on the GDP per capita of countries.1 The study period is 1960-
2001. Since data is not available for all countries and all years, the ‘end of the study 
period’ for a specific country refers to the most recent year for which data is available.    
 
The onset of a stagnation spell is defined as a year in which a country’s per capita real 
income is lower than at any time in the previous two years and higher than at any time in 
the subsequent four years. At the onset of a stagnation spell, a country’s per capita real 
income is both the lowest in the three-year interval concluding with it, and the highest in 
the five-year interval beginning with it.  This criterion is deliberately defined stringently, 
so as to avoid identifying brief interruptions of growth as stagnation spells.  Although the 
onset of a stagnation spell is defined in terms of the relation between income levels in 
                                                 
1 Income in a given year is represented by the three-year moving average centered on that year, in order to 
focus on meaningful variations that are not due to measurement error or very fleeting economic shocks.  
We use data on the GDP per capita in constant local currency units.  Our reason for using LCUs is that 
PPP-adjusted real GDP figures are not, properly speaking, inter-temporally comparable. Attempts to make 
them so, such as the Penn World Tables, introduce other distortions that we wish to avoid here. The spells 
of stagnation that we identify are largely dependent on the features of the per-capita income time series, 
which are appropriately captured by LCU data. Inter-country comparability of time-series is not required 
for this purpose. The main aim of the paper is to introduce the concept of real income stagnation and 
examine its empirical relevance. We operationalize the concept of real income stagnation using LCU GDP 
data; however the analysis can easily be conducted using PPP-adjusted GDP figures instead.  Such an 
exercise would yield largely similar results due to the high correlation between year-on-year growth rates of 
the two GDP series.   We have calculated these correlations for a sub-sample of 108 countries from our 
main dataset (for which PPP-adjusted GDP data for 1960-2000 are available in PTW Mark 6.1). Almost 
two thirds of the countries had a simple correlation coefficient larger than 0.80, and three quarters of the 
sampled countries had a correlation coefficient larger than 0.70.  For specific countries, the two times series 
diverge [For a detailed study of the divergence between PWT and LCU data in the case of Venezuela, see 
Rodriguez (2006)]. In our view the LCU time series is to be strongly preferred in such cases since it is 
dependent on local national income data and does not reflect adjustments brought about for the sole 
purpose of level comparability across countries.  The PWT income series for a country often reflects the 
use of arbitrary premises or adjustments for a variety of reasons including the past or present non-
participation of many countries in the price surveys of the International Comparison Programme 
(requiring reliance upon questionable regression estimates for these countries), the arbitrary choice of  
overlapping ‘link countries’ to relate real incomes in one region to real incomes elsewhere, the impact of 
the choice of base year on comparisons of real-incomes across country-years, and other factors. We do use 
PWT incomes where they are needed to undertake cross-sectional comparisons of countries.  
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adjacent years, the motive is reliably to identify the onset of periods of sustained 
negligible or negative income growth.  
 
A turning point is defined as a year in which a country’s real income is at least one 
percent higher than it was in the previous year, and at least one percent lower than it is in 
the subsequent year.  This criterion is made permissive, so as to capture the resumption 
of sustained income growth, even at a low level. 
 
A spell of stagnation is defined as the period from the onset of stagnation to the first 
turning point after the onset. We define the length of a spell as the length of this period.  
Since the criterion for identifying the onset of stagnation is stringent and the criterion for 
identifying the turning point is permissive, spells defined in this way are defined 
stringently.  
 
The depth of a spell of stagnation is defined as the difference between the income at the 
onset and the minimum income during the spell, expressed as a share of the income at 
the end of the study period.  The depth of the spell of stagnation has a counterfactual 
interpretation. Specifically, it represents the percentage by which the per capita income 
of a country would be higher than it is at the end of the study period if it had 
experienced a constant income between the onset of stagnation and the year in which the 
minimum income during the spell was attained instead of having had the income path 
that it actually had. This counterfactual is conservative in that it assumes zero growth 
rather than positive growth in this time interval.  
 
The concepts of spell of stagnation, depth and length of stagnation, are illustrated in 




         Figure 1. Spell of stagnation, Syria 
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The income at the end of the study period is defined as the average of the incomes in the 
last three years of the study period (1960-2001), so as to avoid idiosyncratic results that 
derive from the presence of short-term volatility. 
 
 
Identifying Countries as Stagnators 
A stagnator is defined as a country that has experienced a spell of stagnation at some 
point during the study period.  
 
A country’s length of stagnation is defined as the sum of the lengths of all of the spells 
of stagnation it has experienced. 
 
A country’s depth of stagnation is defined as the sum of the depths of all of the spells of 
stagnation it has experienced. A country’s depth of stagnation has a counterfactual 
interpretation. Specifically, it represents the percentage by which the per capita income 
of a country would be higher than it is at the end of the study period if it had 
experienced a constant income between the onset of every spell of stagnation and the year 
in which the minimum income during that spell was attained, instead of having had the 
income path that it actually had. This counterfactual is conservative in that it assumes 
zero growth rather than positive growth over each such time interval.    
 
During a given decade, a country is defined as a decadal stagnator if at least three years 
within the decade belong to a stagnation spell. This definition is designed to avoid 
counting as decadal stagnators countries that merely experienced the end (or beginning) 
of a spell of stagnation in a given decade. Rather, it identifies a country as a decadal 
stagnator if it has experienced a sufficiently long period of stagnation in the decade.  
 
A country’s decadal length of stagnation is defined as the number of years spent in 
spells of stagnation during the decade.   
 
A spell of stagnation is used to calculate the decadal depth of stagnation (defined below) 
if at least three years belonging to the spell are contained within the decade. 
 
A country’s decadal depth of stagnation is defined as the percentage by which its 
income at the end of the decade2 would have been higher if it had experienced zero 
growth in each interval from the first year of a stagnation spell within the decade to the 
point at which its minimum income during the spell and during the decade were 
experienced (rather than having had the growth experience that it actually did).   
 
                                                 
2 We use the mean income over the last three years of the decade to represent the income at the end of the 
decade. 
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Stagnation versus Low Average Growth  
The conceptual difference between stagnation (as defined above) and low average income 
growth can be understood as follows: a stagnation spell consists of an uninterrupted 
sequence of poor growth years. In contrast, an episode of low income growth can be 
composed of any sequence of growth years, including a sequence which involves 
alternating positive and negative income shocks.  Different income paths can possess the 
same average growth rates but very different patterns of growth, some of which contain 
stagnation spells and some of which do not.  Suppose that ty represents the real income 
per capita of a country in time period t, and tγ  represents the growth rate of real income 
per capita between (t-1) and t. Consider the following identity, which reflects the final 
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The final income Ty is invariant to the sequence in which the growth rates tγ  appear. 
Further, the average (geometric mean) growth rate over the period is invariant to the 
sequence. Countries can possess identical per capita income growth rates but very 
different growth sequences.  As discussed briefly below (and also noted, for example, in 
Reddy and Minoiu (2006)), the resulting distinct growth sequences can have very 
different welfare implications.    
 
Our focus in this paper is however on the description and interpretation of a possible 
feature of a growth sequence. In particular, we examine the occurrence in countries of 
uninterrupted sequences of negligible or negative income growth years (i.e., stagnation 
spells) as distinguished from patterns of negative income growth years alternating in 
some way with positive income growth years.  
 
 
Distinguishing Stagnation from other Features of the Growth Sequence 
Consider a sequence of real incomes{ }ty .  Associated with this sequence of real incomes 
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Inter-temporal economic patterns can be sought in relation to any one of these three 
series. For example, it may be of interest to examine the lowness or (highness) of 
incomes, of growth rates, or of rates of acceleration.  The concept of stagnation 
employed in this paper adopts a focus on uninterrupted sequences of low growth rates.  
In contrast, other recent contributions to the literature (e.g., Hausmann, Pritchett and 
Rodrik (2005)) (henceforth, ‘HPR’) adopt a “hybrid” concept, which simultaneously 
refers to more than one of these levels of analysis. An episode of growth acceleration is 
defined by HPR as fulfilling the following conditions: the average growth rate between 
the beginning of the acceleration episode and its end is at least 3.5 percent per annum; 
the difference between the mean growth rate during the acceleration episode and the 
period preceding it is at least 2 percent per annum. Finally, the post-episode income level 
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is higher than the pre-episode peak.  It is evident that HPR’s approach mizes criteria 
involving income levels, rates of growth and rates of growth acceleration. From this 
standpoint, it is far from clear that it captures growth accelerations as such. The criteria 
used also appear to be somewhat ad hoc. 
 
 
Growth Patterns and Welfare  
It should be noted that neither the concept of real income stagnation, nor that of growth 
accelerations, can be used straightforwardly for purposes of welfare assessment.  In this 
section, we shall use a few examples to illustrate the issues involved in making welfare 
comparisons of income streams characterized by stagnation experiences and associated 
steady-growth counterfactuals.  
 
If two countries’ income streams begin and end at the same income levels over a single 
time period, then the countries will possess the same (geometric) average growth rates. 
However, they may possess very different income paths over this period. Consider, for 
example, the income growth experience of Jordan and Morocco between 1975 and 1991 
[depicted in Figure 2]. In this period, the two countries had an average growth rate of 
1.025 percent.  Their (Penn World Tables) per capita income in 1975 was in both cases 
around $2,400 and that in 1991 was in both cases approximately $3,600.  While Jordan 
experienced rapid early income growth followed by a stagnation spell between 1987 and 
1992, Morocco’s income path was characterized by fairly steady growth throughout the 
period.  Despite the stagnation experience, Jordan experienced higher welfare throughout 
the period according to a simple criterion, that of first-order dominance of its income 
stream over Morocco’s: Jordan’s income stream was at least as high in every year as 
Morocco’s. On average during the period, Jordanians were richer than Moroccans by 
$1,093 international (1996 PPP) dollars.   
 
Consider also the hypothetical case of two countries that possess the same average growth 
rate over a given period of time, and experience similar stagnation spells, but do so at 
different times, and as a result experience very different levels of material well-being.  It is 
important to draw a distinction between an experience of stagnation which arises early in 
the study period and is followed by recovery, and an experience of stagnation that arises 
towards the end of the study period and is preceded by prolonged growth.  An early 
stagnation spell followed by recovery will cause a country to have lost income relative to 
the steady-growth path, whereas an experience of high growth rates early on followed by 
a downturn towards the end of the period will lead a country to have gained wealth 
relative to the same steady-growth path.  While both countries will be classified as 
stagnators (and possess the same average growth rate), the timing of the stagnation spell 
is greatly relevant to assessing whether the country has experienced gains or losses in 
welfare relative to the steady-growth counterfactual.  It is not the experience of 
stagnation alone, but the entirety of the growth path that is important in assessing 
welfare.   
 
Average growth rates are a useful summary statistic for the income growth experience of a 
country, but can conceal the occurrence of large gains and losses in wealth or welfare.   
Since it is implausible to believe that the (net) wealth which accrues to a country over a 
period of time is inconsequential for investment, capital accumulation and human well-
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being, we may conclude that features of the entire growth path (including the occurrence 
and timing of stagnation experiences) will have welfare implications.    
 















































Figure 2. Jordan (high income path) is a stagnator, while Morocco (low income path) is not. Both 




| 2 | STAGNATION EXPERIENCE ACROSS COUNTRIES & OVER TIME 
 
In the next section we rely primarily on a data set that we have constructed by expanding 
that used to analyze the determinants of growth by Levine and Renelt (1992). Our data 
set contains 119 countries for which constant LCU GDP per capita data is available over 
the period 1960-2001, thereby permitting the identification of stagnation spells.  
Definitions and sources of all of the variables contained in the dataset are provided in 
Appendix 1. We treat the cases of small-island countries and transition countries (only 
some of which are included in the Levine and Renelt data set), separately.  
 
Frequency and Features of Stagnation by Country Type 
 
Countries in the Main Data Set 
Table 1 reports the frequency with which stagnators appear among the countries that 
belong to the main data set.  Of the 119 countries in the dataset, a remarkable 72 (or 
60.5 percent) are stagnators.  Some striking facts are immediately apparent. For example, 
only 4 of the 24 rich countries belonging to the OECD were stagnators is in this period 
(16.7 percent)3.  In contrast 91.67 percent (or 22 of 24) countries in Latin American and 
82.5 percent (or 33 of 40) countries in sub-Saharan Africa were stagnators.     
 
It is also interesting to note that stagnators are heavily represented among countries 
dependent on primary commodities.  Among countries belonging to OPEC, 8 of 10 
were stagnators.   We also check how prevalent stagnators are among primary 
commodity export dependent countries, by constructing two alternative measures of such 
dependence. Countries are classified as primary commodity exporters according to 
criterion I if the share of exports of primary commodities in GNP in 1970 was above the 
mean level for the sample.  Countries are classified as primary commodity exporters 
according to criterion II if the share of exports of primary commodities in GNP in 1970 
was one standard deviation above the mean level for the sample.  It is interesting to note 
that a very large proportion of primary commodity exporting countries are stagnators;  
the proportion of stagnators is roughly the same regardless of which criterion is used to 
identify primary commodity exporting countries (87.5 percent when criterion I is used, 
and 83.3 percent when criterion II is used).   A majority of landlocked countries (65.2 
percent) are also stagnators.   
 
Table 2 reports in greater detail the stagnation experiences of the countries belonging to 
these different categories.  It may be observed that the average depth of stagnation among 
stagnators varies considerably across geographical categories, from 0.24 in the case of 
Latin America to 0.44 in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, whereas the average length of 
stagnation varies between 10 years (for Latin American countries) and 16 years (in the 
case of sub-Saharan African countries). Thus, sub-Saharan African countries tend to have 
both longer and deeper stagnation experiences than Latin American countries. The 
former also tend to have more stagnation spells per country than the latter (1.5 spells per 
country compared to 1.3 spells per country).  
 
                                                 
3 The OECD stagnators are: Greece, Iceland, New Zealand and Switzerland.  
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Remarkably, oil-exporting (OPEC) countries have both the highest average depth of 
stagnation among all categories of countries (0.97), as well as the highest number of 
stagnation spells (1.8 spells per country). Intensive (criterion II) primary commodity 
exporters have an average length of stagnation of 18 years (almost half the study period).  
Furthermore, the depth and length of stagnation increases with the intensity of primary 
commodity exports in GNP.  
  
Appendix II identifies the stagnation spells experienced by each of the countries in the 
sample as well as their traits. The longest spell of stagnation was experienced by Zambia 
(33 years, from 1968 to 2000) and the deepest was experienced by Iraq (2.89).   
 
Transition Countries—Transition countries are not included in the main dataset, as for 
many countries the data with which to undertake the analysis do not exist for the period 
1960 to 1990.   Table 6 describes the frequency and features of stagnation among the 
transition countries, for which we have data during the period 1990-20014. Of the 26 
countries for which stagnation analysis was possible, 20 (or 77 percent) were stagnators 
in this study period.  Moreover, the average depth of stagnation was a striking 0.69 
(more than two-thirds of the end of study period income) and the average length of 
stagnation was 6.6 (almost two-thirds of the study period). The country with the 
maximum depth of stagnation (2.37) was Tajikistan, whereas the country with the 
maximum length of stagnation (11 years) was Moldova.   
 
Small Island Developing States—Many small island developing states are also not included 
in the main dataset, due to gaps in the data available for many of them.  Table 7 
describes the frequency and features of stagnation among small island developing states 
(as identified by the United Nations) for the period 1960 to 2001.  Of 34 countries for 
which stagnation analysis was possible, 17 were stagnators. The average depth of 
stagnation was 0.31 and the average length of stagnation was 11.5 years.  Roughly half 
the island stagnators had a single spell of stagnation, and roughly half had two spells of 
stagnation. The maximum depth of stagnation (1.82) was experienced by Kiribati, while 
the maximum length of stagnation (26 years) was experienced by Haiti.   
 
The World as a Whole—The unified sample (including together the countries in the main 
dataset, transition countries and small island developing states) contains 178 countries.  
Of the 168 countries for which stagnation analysis was possible, 103 (61 percent, i.e., 
more than half) were stagnators.    
 
Experience Across the Decades (the World)  
The stagnation experience of countries across the decades, is described in Table 3 (for 
countries in the main data set).  It can be seen that the number of decadal stagnators 
increased sharply and steadily between the 1960s (when there were 12, amounting to 12 
percent of the countries for which data was available) and the 1980s (when there were 
58, amounting to 50 percent of the countries for which data was available), and 
                                                 
4 For several countries, there is data going back to as early as 1960 (Hungary and China) and 1965 
(Georgia, Latvia and Russian Federation). We do not employ this data here.   
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diminished somewhat in the 1990s (to 36, amounting to 32 percent of the countries for 
which data was available).   
 
From the worldwide perspective, the 1980s seem to have been the worst decade. 
The average length of stagnation peaked in the 1980s at almost 7 years, as did the 
average depth of stagnation at 0.20. The average depth of stagnation increased 
monotonically from the 1960s to the 1980s before diminishing in the 1990s. The 
average length of stagnation varied between 5.5 and 6.8 years/country across the four 
decades, again peaking in the 1980s.  
 
Experience Across the Decades (Regions)   
The proportion of countries that are stagnators (among the countries for which the 
analysis is possible) is higher in every decade in sub-Saharan Africa than in Latin 
America, with the exception of the 1980s (Tables 5A and 5B).  For the whole study 
period however, the proportion of Latin American stagnators exceeds that of sub-Saharan 
African stagnators.  
 
In both continents the proportion of stagnators among countries increases steadily 
through the decades, peaking in the 1980s (when it reached a maximum of 69 percent in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and 79 percent in Latin America) and diminishing somewhat in the 
1990s.  
 
As shown in Table 4, in all four decades the countries that spent the longest number of 
years in stagnation were most likely to be in sub-Saharan Africa.  As shown in Table 5A, 
the average depth of stagnation was higher in Latin America than it was in Africa in all 
decades other than the 1990s.  In sub-Saharan Africa, the average length of stagnation 
was highest in the 1980s and 1990s whereas in Latin America it was highest in the 1960s 
and 1980s. In sub-Saharan Africa, the average depth of stagnation was highest in the 
1990s whereas in Latin America it was highest in the 1960s.  This suggests that the 
1990s have not been a period of recovery in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
It is also interesting to examine the correlation between the length and depth of 
stagnation by region and decade (see Table 5B).  It appears that in the 1990s, stagnation 
experiences in Latin America were likely to be long and deep. This is also true, but to a 
lesser degree, in sub-Saharan Africa.  It is notable that the correlation between depth and 
length of stagnation seems to have been increasing monotonically across decades for 
countries in both continents. Over time, it has become more likely that stagnation spells 




| 3 | FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH STAGNATION 
 
n order to identify the factors associated with stagnation, we undertook a probit 
analysis of the factors that appear to affect the probability of being a stagnator. We 
treat whether a country is a stagnator as a binary dependent variable. The 
probabilities of occurrence of stagnation are assumed to be influenced by the 
independent variables and to be distributed normally.  
 
In Table 9, we report the summary statistics for the variables used in the subsequent 
regressions. Tables 10-11 outline the regression results for three versions of probit models 
with STAGNATOR (a variable which takes on a value of one when a country is a 
stagnator and a value of zero when it is not) as the dependent variable.  
 
Appendix 1 lists the variables used in the analysis. Summary statistics concerning the 
variables used in all the probit regressions discussed in this section of the paper are shown 
in Table 9. We have tried to include in the regressions undertaken (from which those 
reported are drawn) variables that are standardly used in the literature on the 
determinants of growth.      
 
The models have relatively good ‘fit’, with pseudo-R2 ranging between 0.36 and 0.69.   
In addition, they show that certain factors are significantly and often robustly associated 
with stagnation.  These include the growth rate of domestic credit, negatively associated 
with being a stagnator; the difference between the growth rate of the economically active 
population - between ages 15 and 65 - and the growth rate of the population total 
(‘GEAPOPP’), negatively associated with being a stagnator; a dummy variable taking the 
value one for primary commodity exporters (according to criterion I) and zero otherwise, 
positively associated with being a stagnator; the number of revolutions and coups per 
year, positively associated with being a stagnator; an index of civil liberties taking the 
value of 1 at the highest and 7 at the lowest, positively associated with being a stagnator 
(implying an association between weaker civil liberties and stagnation); a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 for Latin American countries and zero otherwise, and a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 for sub-Saharan African countries and zero otherwise, both 
positively associated with being a stagnator.   
 
The signs of these relationships are as one might predict, as is discussed below.    The 
magnitude of these relationships is also often very substantial, as shown in Table 12A 
(columns 1-3). For example, the probability that a country is a stagnator when 
GEAPOPP (the rate at which the growth of economically active population outstrips the 
rate of growth of the entire population) is one-half a standard deviation above the mean 
for all countries is estimated (depending on the model specification) to be between 41 
and 46 percent less than when it is one half a standard deviation below the mean5. The 
probability that a country is a stagnator when the number of revolutions and coups per 
year is one-half a standard deviation above the mean for all countries is estimated 
(depending on the model specification) to be 20 percent more than when it is one-half a 
standard deviation below the mean. Similarly, the probability that the country is a 
                                                 




stagnator when the index of civil liberties is one-half a standard deviation above the mean 
for all countries is estimated to be 35 percent more than when it is one-half a standard 
deviation below the mean.  It is also found that primary commodity exporters according 
to criterion I have a probability of being a stagnator around 33 percent above other 
countries.     
 
As a check on the possibility that some of the factors considered above arise 
endogenously as a result of countries becoming stagnators, we repeated the analysis by 
using as the dependent variable STAGNATOR90, a dummy variable taking on a value 
of one if a country was a stagnator in the 1990s, and zero otherwise. We used data for 
the independent variables from the earlier period 1960 to 1989, so as to capture possible 
lagged relationships running from these independent variables to STAGNATOR906.  It 
is important to be cautious in interpreting the results found here as revealing any causal 
information, however, since stagnation from decade to decade is highly correlated, as 
discussed further below.  We find the relationships to be somewhat weaker, but still to be 
present.  As reported in Table 11, the Sub Saharan Africa Dummy, the Latin America 
Dummy, GEAPOPP, and the number of revolutions and coups per year are significant. 
In contrast, the primary commodity exporter dummy I, the index of civil liberties, and 
the growth rate of domestic credit are no longer significant. This is not wholly surprising, 
as the Sub Saharan Africa Dummy, the Latin America Dummy, and GEAPOPP (directly or 
indirectly) capture "structural" features of the economy that may have a long-term 
impact, whereas the index of civil liberties, and the growth rate of domestic credit 
represent phenomena (such as ambient political circumstances and the conduct of 
monetary policy) that may arguably have only a more transitory impact on economic 
performance.    
 
It is also not surprising that measures of primary commodity export dependence are 
significant determinants of stagnation, in light of the recent literature on the "natural 
resource curse", which emphasizes that for a range of political and economic (e.g. "Dutch 
disease") reasons, countries wealthy in natural resources may be poor economic 
performers (see, for instance, Rodriguez and Sachs (1999), Sachs and Warner (1999), 
Tornell and Lane (1999)).  However, the lack of significance of the primary commodity 
exporter dummy I in regressions of STAGNATOR90 raises a question mark about the 
robustness of this relationship. This may be because a great deal of the effect of being a 
primary commodity exporter is captures by whether a country belongs in specific 
groupings (in particular Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa).  The number of 
stagnating countries which are primary commodity exporters according to the first of our 
criteria but neither in Latin America nor in sub-Saharan Africa is only seven (Algeria, 
Fiji, Iceland, Iraq, Kuwait, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia).  The number of stagnating 
countries which are primary commodity exporters according to the second of our criteria, 
but are neither in Latin-American nor in sub-Saharan Africa is only four (Fiji, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia).  In the overall sample of 119 countries (of which 32 are primary 
commodity exporters according to the first criterion and 12 according to the second), the 
resulting independent variation may be insufficient to separately identify the effect of 
being a primary-commodity exporter on stagnation.   
 
                                                 
6 Regression results using data from the earlier period 1974-1989 are similar to the ones we report here.  
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The fact that GEAPOPP is significant underlines that a rapid rate of population increase 
(or rapid aging) that creates an increased rate of dependency of the young and the elderly 
upon the productive workers in the middle age brackets, may be an important factor 
creating vulnerability to per capita income stagnation. However, the relationship may be 
purely endogenous. It may simply be that stagnation causes a reduction in the 
economically active population and therefore a reduction in GEAPOPP.  This latter 
theory is a possible explanation of the results found in the regressions involving 
STAGNATOR but not of those involving STAGNATOR90, as the latter seeks to 
identify the factors associated with subsequent stagnation. Both mechanisms may in fact 
be present.  This is suggested by the fact that the magnitude of the effect associated with 
GEAPOPP is substantially smaller in relation to STAGNATOR90 than in relation to 
STAGNATOR [See Table 12A]. 
 
It is interesting to note that the investment share of GDP is also occasionally significant. 
The sign of the relationship suggests that higher investment is associated with a higher 
probability of stagnation.  This seems at first implausible, but may be understood in light 
of the possibility that investment (especially planned public investment) is not always as 
downwardly flexible as is real income.  In this light, the identified relationship may be 
more of an accounting curiosity than it is causally important.   
 
In both sets of regressions, the Latin America dummy variable is consistently highly 
significant, whereas the African dummy variable is moderately significant only in the 
STAGNATOR90 regressions. One reason that this might be true is that the African 
dummy variable is highly correlated with other variables that are significantly associated 
with being a stagnator (especially GEAPOPP, the primary commodity exporter dummy 
I, the number of revolutions and coups, and the index of civil liberties), whereas the 
Latin America dummy is not to the same extent. This may be seen in Table 12B, which 
reports pair-wise correlation coefficients among the variables used in both sets of 
regressions. Although stagnators are more likely to be present in both Africa and Latin 
America, the factors underlying stagnation in Africa appear to be captured better by 
those included in the regression analysis than are the factors that underlie stagnation in 
Latin America.  The fact that the Latin America dummy variable is consistently 
significant suggests that there are variables omitted from the analysis that are important 




| 4 | THE TENDENCY FOR STAGNATION TO PERSIST 
 
t is possible to undertake an analysis of the tendency of countries to shift between 
non-stagnator and stagnator status. 7 Below, we explore whether countries that have a 
specific status (as stagnators or non-stagnators) in a particular decade are likely to 
maintain that status or change status in the subsequent decade.  This analysis is 
undertaken in Table 13A in terms of the raw number of countries that ‘stay or switch’ 
and in Table 13B in terms of the proportion of countries that ‘stay or switch’ between 
stagnator and non-stagnator status in successive decades.  
 
The analysis leads to some striking conclusions.    
 
First, if a country is a decadal stagnator in the 60s, it has a relatively small chance of not 
being a decadal stagnator in the 1990s (8.3 percent).  In contrast, countries that are 
stagnators in the 1970s or 1980s, have a higher chance of escaping stagnation by the end 
of the sample period (31.8 percent and 37.9 percent, respectively). However, the 
probability of being a stagnator in the 1990s if a country was a stagnator in previous 
decades is quite high: 75 percent for stagnators from the 1960s, 54.5 percent for 
stagnators from the 1970s, and 56.9 percent for stagnators from the 1980s. Finally, the 
probability that a non-stagnator in the 1960s is a stagnator in the 1990s is relatively high 
(56.9 percent). The probability of being a stagnator in the 1990s is therefore raised by 
about 20 percent by having been a stagnator (as opposed to a non-stagnator) in the 
1960s.  
 
The highest probability (37.9 percent) of a stagnator becoming a non-stagnator in a 
subsequent decade is experienced between the 1980s and the 1990s.  The highest 
probability of a non-stagnator remaining a non-stagnator (74.5 percent) is experienced 
between the 1960s and the 1970s.  It is notable that the probability of switching out of 
stagnation has slightly increased over the decades. However, the probability of staying 
out of stagnation has not increased over the decades for the entire sample of countries. In 
fact, non-stagnators have had chances often significantly higher than 50 of experiencing 
stagnation in subsequent decades.  
 
It is most striking that the countries most likely to have been stagnators in the 1960s 
have a 75 probability of being so in the 1990s.  This suggests that underlying and 
difficult to change structural features of countries make them vulnerable to stagnation, or 
that stagnation episodes have long-lasting and detrimental effects that generate future 
vulnerability to stagnation.  
 
It is also important to note that collapses do not occur randomly. There appear to be 
trigger effects that are concentrated geographically (sub Saharan Africa, Latin America).    
                                                 
7 Some caution is required in interpreting these results since the “transition” probabilities could be 
indicative of either transitory or systematic features of the causal process giving rise to stagnation. 
Furthermore, the estimates of the probabilities rely on one observation in the time series used to construct 
the stagnator dummy (i.e., on a single realization of the stochastic process that may be present in the 
world). Therefore, one cannot make a strong case based on these findings unless further assumptions are 




In sub-Saharan Africa (tables 14A and 14B), once a stagnator, the probability of 
remaining a stagnator in a subsequent decade ranges between 53.8 percent and 77.8 
percent. Even worse, in the 1970s African non-stagnators were faced with a probability 
of 93.8 percent of falling in stagnation during the 1980s. A similar pattern is observed 
for Latin American non-stagnators (tables 15A and 15B), which had a probability of 
88.9 percent of stagnating in the 1980s, if they had not stagnated in the 1970s. The data 
is suggestive of the fact that structural features of the economy may play an important 
role: if they have stagnated in the 1960s, African countries are 77.8 percent likely to have 
stagnated in the 1990s, while if they have stagnated in the 1960s Latin American 






e have examined the patterns and causes of real income stagnation (in which 
real-income growth was negligible or negative for a sizable uninterrupted 
sequence of years) during the last four decades in a large cross section of 
countries. Real income stagnation is a concept concerning the pattern of economic 
growth, and is distinct from that of low average growth as such. We have argued that real 
income stagnation is also conceptually different from other growth patterns studied in 
the literature (e.g., those proposed by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005)). 
However, all such concepts must be used with care when undertaking welfare assessment.  
 
We have found evidence to suggest that a large number of poor countries in the world 
have suffered deep and lengthy spells of stagnation in the last four decades. These spells 
of stagnation have caused many of these countries to have lower incomes today than they 
had at some point in the past.  All countries which have experienced stagnation spells 
have lost ‘potential’ income. Countries that suffered stagnation are more likely to have 
been poor, to have been located in certain regions of the world (in particular Latin 
America and sub-Saharan Africa), to have been conflict-ridden and dependent on 
primary commodity exports.   
 
Countries that suffered from stagnation in the distant past are also much more likely to 
have suffered from stagnation in the recent past. These results suggest either that 
stagnation spells have long-lasting effects that make the reoccurrence of stagnation likely 
or that there are enduring ‘structural’ features (within countries or in the global 





Chen, L. and Anand, S. (1999). “Health Implications of Economics Policies: A 
Framework of Analysis”, Discussion Paper, Office of Development Studies, UNDP 
 
Ben-David, D. and Papell, D.H. (1998). “Slowdowns and Meltdowns: Post-war Growth 
Evidence from 74 Countries”, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 80, pp. 561-71.  
 
Hausmann, R., Pritchett, L. and Rodrik, D. (2005). “Growth Accelerations”, Journal of 
Economic Growth, Vol. 10(4), pp. 303-329. 
 
Levine, R. and Renelt, D. (1992), “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 82(4), pp. 942-963. 
 
Pritchett, L. (2000), “Understanding Patterns of Economic Growth:  Searching for Hills 
among Plateaus, Mountains, and Plains”, World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 14(2), pp. 
221-50.  
 
Reddy, S. and Minoiu, C. (2006). “True Income Gains versus Economic Growth: A 
Conceptual Distinction and An Empirical Assessment”, mimeo, Columbia University  
 
Sachs, J. D. and Warner, A. M. (1999). “The Big Rush, Natural Resource Booms And 
Growth”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 59(1), pp. 43-76.  
 
Rodrik, D. (1999). “Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict 
and Growth Collapses”, Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 4(4), pp. 385-412. 
 
Rodriguez, F. (2006). “The Anarchy of Numbers: Understanding the Evidence on 
Venezuelan Economic Growth,” Wesleyan Economic Working Paper No. 2006-009, 
Wesleyan University, Department of Economics. 
 
Rodriguez, F. and Sachs, J. (1999). "Why Do Resource Abundant Economies Grow 
More Slowly? A New Explanation and an Application to Venezuela", Journal of Economic 
Growth, Vol. 4(3), pp. 277-303. 
 
Tornell, A. and Lane, P. (1999). "The Voracity Effect," American Economic Review, 







   
 
 19
I. TABLES AND CHARTS 
 
Table 1: Prevalence of Stagnation by Country Type (Main Data Set) 
 
Sample description:  
 
Total number of countries in the Levine-
Renelt data set (1992)  
119 
Total number of countries for which 
stagnation analysis was possible based on 
GDP per capita in LCUs  
1198 
Total number of stagnators (1960-2001) 72 
 
 
Country Type Number of 
countries 






countries in total  
Sub-Saharan Africa 40 33 82.50 
Latin America 24 22 91.67 
OECD 24 4 16.67 
OPEC 10 8 80.00 
Primary Commodity 
Exporters I 9 
32 28 87.50 
Primary Commodity 
Exporters II 10  
12 10 83.33 
Landlocked countries11 23 15 65.21 
 
                                                 
8 The only country for which GDP per capita in constant LCU is not available is Taiwan. We have used 
real GDP adjusted for PPP in US$ from the Economist Intelligence Unit country data online instead.    
9 Based on the first measure: countries with share of exports of primary commodities in GNP in 1970 
above the mean are considered primary commodity exporters.  
10 Based on the second measure: countries with share of exports of primary commodities in GNP in 1970 
above one standard deviation from the mean are considered primary commodity exporters.  
11 This is the variables ACCESS from the Sachs and Warner dataset. Physical access to international waters 
is measured by our land-lockedness variable.  A country that borders the ocean (a "coastal economy") and 
that has a container port is given a value of 0, reflecting complete access to international shipping.  A 
landlocked country without navigable access to the sea via rivers is given a value of 1.  
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Table 2: Characteristics of Stagnation Spells by Country Type (Main Data Set) 
 
 















33 0.44 16 1.5 33 years: 
Zambia 
Latin America 22 0.24 10 1.3 26 years:  
Haiti 
OECD countries 4 0.03 7 1.3 7 years:  
Greece 




Exporters I  




Exporters II  








Table 3: Frequency and features of Stagnation by Decade (Main Data Set) 
 
 
                                                                         
























Number of stagnators in the overall study 
period for which data is available in the 
decade12  
63 68 70 68 
Percentage of stagnators in the overall study 
period for which data is available in the decade 
88% 94% 97% 94% 
Number of countries for which data is 
available13 
103 112 116 114 
Percentage of decadal stagnators among all of 









Average length of stagnation 5.7 
years 
 




Average depth of stagnation 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.15 
Total number of spells14  12 23 58 43 
Average number of spells per country in the 
decade 
1 1.13 1.1 1 
 
                                                 
12 No data in the 1960s for the following stagnators: Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Iran, Jordan, Mali, 
Mozambique, Surinam and Tanzania. No data in the 1970s for Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique and 
Tanzania; No data in the1980s for stagnators Afghanistan and Tanzania. No data in the 1990s for 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, and Somalia.     
13 No data in the 1960s for non-stagnators Cyprus, West Germany, Mauritius, Swaziland, Turkey, Uganda 
and Yemen. No data in the 1970s for non-stagnators Mauritius, Uganda and Yemen. No data in the 1980s 
for  non-stagnator Yemen. No data in the 1990s for non-stagnator Oman.  
14 The total no. of spells is almost the same as the total no. of countries, with the exception of the 1970s, 
when Chad experienced two stagnation spells.  
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Table 4: Longest and Deepest Stagnation by Decade (Main Data Set) 
 
 
Decade Longest stagnation Length of Stagnation 
1960s Afghanistan, Chad, Haiti, Kuwait, Senegal, 
Somalia, Sudan  
7 years 
1970s Kuwait, Zambia 10 years 
1980s Central African Republic, Dem. Republic of 
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Guyana, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Zambia  
10 years 
1990s Central African Republic, Dem. Republic of 
Congo, Republic of Congo,  Haiti, Kenya, 
Niger, Sierra Leone, Zambia  
10 years 
 
Decade Deepest Stagnator Depth of Stagnation 
60s Haiti 0.76 
70s Kuwait 0.67 
80s Iraq 1.95 
90s Democratic Republic of Congo 1.23 
 
 
Tables 5A&B: Frequency and Features Of Stagnation Spells By Decade And 












33 9 13 27 25 
Total number of 
countries for which 













the countries for 












Average depth 0.44 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.21 








22 1 4 19 10 
Total number of 
countries for which 













the countries for 













Average depth 0.24 0.41 0.15 0.17 0.07 









1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Entire sample 
 
0.55 0.28 0.50 0.33 0.54 
Sub-Saharan  
Africa 
0.56 0.12 0.26 0.39 0.47 
Latin America  0.69 N/A15 0.12 0.48 0.78 
 
                                                 
15 The only Latin American country stagnating in the 1960s is Haiti.  
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Table 6: Frequency and Features of Stagnation among Transition Countries 
 
Sample Description  
 
Total number of countries in the sample   29 
Total number of countries for which stagnation analysis was 
possible based on GDP per capita in constant LCU16   
26 
Total number of stagnators (1990-2001) 20 
 
Frequency and Features of Stagnation 
 
 Number of 
stagnators 
(1990-2001) 








































1985 1990 1995 2000
year
maximum depth among transition countries (2.37)
Tajikistan:
 
                                                 
16 The three transition countries for which spell analysis is not possible are Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
17 77 percent of transition countries for which sufficient data is available were stagnating in the 1990s.  
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Table 7:  Frequency and Features of Stagnation among Small Island Developing States 
 
Sample description  
 
Total number of countries in the sample  4118 
Total number of countries for which 
stagnation analysis was possible based on 
GDP per capita in constant LCUs 
3419 
Total number of stagnators (1960-2001) 17 
 
 Number of 
stagnators 
(1960-2001) 
Average depth Average length 
(in years) 
Average number 
















depth: 1.82  
Kiribati 
Maximum 
length: 26 years 
Haiti 


























1970 1980 1990 2000
year
maximum depth among small island developing states (1.82)
Kiribati:
 
                                                 
18 The list of small island developing states is available at: http://www.sidsnet.org/sids_list.html (accessed: 
March 25, 2005)  
19 The 7 small island developing states for which spells analysis was not impossible due to few data points 
or inexistent data are: Cook Islands, Cuba, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Tokelau and Tuvalu.  
20 50 percent of small island developing states for which data is available, qualify as stagnators. 
21 The 7 small island developing states that have experienced 2 spells of stagnation during the sample 
period are: Jamaica, Haiti, Samoa, the Bahamas, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.  
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Table 8: Frequency and Features of Stagnation throughout the World 
 
Summary statistics for the unified sample22 
 
Total number of countries in the sample   178 
Total number of countries for which stagnation analysis was possible based 
on GDP per capita in constant LCUs 
168 
Total number of stagnators  103 




Decadal summary statistics for the unified sample 
 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Total number of stagnators 12 26 67 71 
Total number of countries for which data is 
available 
69 78 94 102 
% of stagnators (in the total number of 












                                                 
22 Note: the unified sample is made up of the main data set (which already contains 11 small island 
developing states), the list of transition countries and that of small island developing states. Of these, six 
are stagnators (and are only counted once in Table 8): Barbados, Fiji, Haiti, Jamaica, Papua New Guinea 
and Trinidad & Tobago.  
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STAGNATOR    0.000 1.000 
STAGNATOR90    0.000 1.000 
Real GDP per capita (1960) (log)  0.142 0.934 -1.570 1.999 
Literacy rate (1960) (log)  -1.116 1.112 -4.605 0.000 
Growth Rate of Domestic Credit (1960-1989) 23.525 20.449 -15.424 134.730 
Investment Share of GDP (1960-1989) 0.208 0.058 0.092 0.402 
Growth of Exports (1960-1989) 6.783 4.824 -0.938 37.454 
Sub Saharan Africa Dummy   0.000 1.000 
Latin America Dummy   0.000 1.000 
GEAPOPP 0.210 0.343 -0.341 1.117 
Primary Commodity Exporter Dummy  I   0.000 1.000 
Revolutions and Coups per year (1960-1984) 0.217 0.253 0.000 1.150 
Index of Civil Liberties (1972-1985)  3.992 1.853 1.000 6.900 
  
Table 10.  Factors Associated with Stagnation:  
 









    
    
Real GDP per capita (1960) (log) 0.4633 0.9380* 1.3593** 
 [0.5598] [0.5286] [0.6758] 
Literacy (1960) (log)  -1.0464 -0.8698 -0.4891 
 [0.6591] [0.5837] [0.6352] 
Growth Rate of Domestic Credit (1960-1989) -0.0170* -0.0227 -0.0363** 
 [0.0096] [0.0146] [0.0146] 
Investment Share of GDP (1960-1989) 6.9502 10.5224** 11.3272** 
 [4.2539] [4.7323] [5.1783] 
Growth of Exports (1960-1989) 0.1062 0.1724* 0.1912** 
 [0.0809] [0.0961] [0.0873] 
Sub Saharan Africa Dummy 0.7174 1.8417** 0.9905 
 [0.7530] [0.8580] [0.9295] 
Latin America Dummy 4.1204*** 4.7922*** 5.3650*** 
 [0.9604] [1.0573] [1.1102] 
GEAPOPP -4.3521*** -4.7758*** -6.0371*** 
 [1.3672] [1.4132] [1.8060] 
Primary Commodity Exporter Dummy I 1.6163** 1.6821** 2.1314*** 
 [0.7616] [0.7835] [0.7536] 
Revolutions and coups per year (1960-1984)  3.2567**  
  [1.4914]  
Index of civil liberties 1972-1985 (1: most freedom)   0.7853*** 
   [0.2358] 
Constant -2.8607** -4.7907*** -6.3294*** 
 [1.3520] [1.3859] [1.8285] 
    
    
    
Observations 83 83 83 
Log-likelihood -21.02 -18.77 -17.85 
Pseudo R-squared 0.63 0.67 0.69 
% correctly predicted 87.95% 91.57% 91.57% 
    
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 11.  Factors Associated with Stagnation: 
 










    
Real GDP per capita (1960) (log) 0.2028 0.0028 0.2453 
 [0.2937] [0.3314] [0.3105] 
Literacy (1960) (log) -0.3219 -0.3424 -0.3020 
 [0.3034] [0.3371] [0.3097] 
Growth Rate of Domestic Credit (1960-1989) -0.0105 -0.0092 -0.0107 
 [0.0087] [0.0083] [0.0088] 
Investment Share of GDP (1960-1989) 2.5637 0.7630 2.3693 
 [4.8833] [4.9879] [4.9369] 
Growth of Exports (1960-1989) 0.0187 0.0337 0.0187 
 [0.0615] [0.0649] [0.0607] 
Sub Saharan Africa Dummy 1.5215** 1.2064** 1.5137** 
 [0.6113] [0.6109] [0.6089] 
Latin American Dummy 1.7386*** 2.0243*** 1.7246*** 
 [0.5038] [0.5559] [0.5037] 
GEAPOPP -0.9701 -1.5778* -0.9284 
 [0.8074] [0.9074] [0.7978] 
Primary Commodity Exporter Dummy I 0.5072 0.6422 0.5234 
 [0.4287] [0.4545] [0.4278] 
Revolutions and coups per year (1960-1984)  -2.5569***  
  [0.9135]  
Index of civil liberties 1972-1985 (1: most freedom)   0.0404 
   [0.1209] 
Constant -1.9792* -1.1471 -2.0818* 
 [1.0223] [0.9913] [1.0638] 
    
    
    
Observations 83 83 83 
Log-likelihood  -35.93 -32.67 -35.91 
Pseudo R-squared 0.36 0.42 0.36 
% correctly predicted 79.52% 81.93% 79.52% 
    
Robust standard errors in brackets    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 12A:  Effects on the dependent variable for Probit models  
(dependent variable STAGNATOR in (1)-(3) and STAGNATOR90 in (4)-(6)) 
 
Effects for the continuous regressors are shown for changes from their sample mean minus 
½ standard deviation to their sample means plus ½ standard deviation. For discrete 















Real GDP per capita (1960) (log) 0.131 
 
0.250 0.302 0.072 0.001 0.086 
Literacy (1960) (log) -0.325 
 
-0.260 -0.122 -0.127 -0.134 -0.119 




-0.136 -0.180 -0.082 -0.071 -0.084 




0.173 0.154 0.055 0.016 0.188 




0.178   0.163 0.025 0.045 0.051 
Sub Saharan Africa Dummy 0.190 
 
0.384   0.191 0.551 0.447 0.548 
Latin America Dummy 0.570 
 
0.607 0.576 0.613 0.684 0.610 
GEAPOPP -0.412 
 
-0.432 -0.463 -0.118 -0.189 -0.113 
Primary Commodity Exporter Dummy I 0.349 
 
0.339 0.323 0.193 0.244 0.199 




  -0.206  
Index of civil liberties (1972-1985)  
(1: most freedom) 
  0.347 
 
  0.028 
Note: no standard errors are reported for the point estimates.  
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Table 12B: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients 
 
 










and coups per 
year 
Index of civil 
liberties 
Sub Saharan Africa 
Dummy 
1.000     
    
Demographic control 
(GEAPOPP) 
-0.544 1.000    
 (0.000)     
Primary Commodity 
Exporter Dummy I 
0.265 -0.101 1.000   
 (0.006) (0.334)    
Revolutions and coups 
per year 
0.179 -0.252 -0.073 1.000  
 (0.052) (0.014) (0.463)   
Index of civil liberties 0.553 -0.356 0.173 0.476 1.000
(1: most freedom) (0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.000)  
Note: p-values in parentheses. 
 










and coups per 
year 
Index of civil 
liberties 
Latin America Dummy 1.000     
      
Demographic control 
(GEAPOPP) 
0.314 1.000    
 (0.002)     
Primary Commodity 
Exporter Dummy I 
-0.001 -0.101 1.000   
 (0.996) (0.334)    
Revolutions and coups 
per year 
0.105 -0.252 -0.073 1.000  
 (0.257) (0.014) (0.463)   
Index of civil liberties -0.135 -0.356 0.173 0.476 1.000
(1: most freedom) (0.146) (0.000) (0.078) (0.000)  
Note: p-values in parentheses.  
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Stag60s       
Nonstag60s       
Stag70s 8 13     
Nonstag70s 4 38     
Stag80s        9 43 15 41   
Nonstag80s 2 8 6 5   
Stag90s 9 29 12 28 33 9 
Nonstag90s 1 20 7         17 22 3 
Note:  A given cell (row, column) represents the number of countries in a given status during a decade (row) 
that had a specific status in a subsequent decade (column).  For example, the number 9 in the first column of 
data should be interpreted as follows: 9 countries that were stagnators in the 1960s were also stagnators in the 
1980s. The number 17 in the fourth column of data should be read as follows: 17 countries that were not 
stagnators in the 1970s were not stagnators in the 1990s either.  
 














Stag60s       
Nonstag60s       
Stag70s 66.7% 25.5%     
Nonstag70s 33.3% 74.5%     
Stag80s 75.0% 84.3% 68.2% 89.1%   
Nonstag80s 16.7% 15.7% 27.3% 10.9%   
Stag90s 75.0% 56.9% 54.5% 60.9% 56.9% 75.0% 
Nonstag90s 8.3% 39.2% 31.8% 36.9% 37.9% 25.0% 
Note:  A given cell (row, column) represents the proportion of countries in a given status during a decade 
(row) that had a specific status in a subsequent decade (column).  For example, the number 75.0% in the 
first column of data should be interpreted as follows: 75.0 percent of countries that were stagnators in the 
1960s were also stagnators in the 1980s. The number 89.1% in the fourth column of data should be read as 
follows: 89.1 percent of countries that were not stagnators in the 1970s were stagnators in the 1980s.  
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Stag60s       
Nonstag60s       
Stag70s 6 6     
Nonstag70s 3 12     
Stag80s 7 17 10 15   
Nonstag80s 2 1 3 1   
Stag90s 7 14 7 15 20 4 
Nonstag90s 1 3 4 1 5 1 
 














Stag60s       
Nonstag60s       
Stag70s 66.7% 33.3%     
Nonstag70s 33.3% 66.7%     
Stag80s 77.8% 94.4% 76.9% 93.8%   
Nonstag80s 22.2% 5.6% 23.1% 6.3%   
Stag90s 77.8% 77.8% 53.8% 93.8% 74.1% 80.0% 
Nonstag90s 11.1% 16.7% 30.8% 6.3% 18.5% 20.0% 
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Stag60s       
Nonstag60s       
Stag70s 0 4     
Nonstag70s 1 16     
Stag80s 1 17 3 16   
Nonstag80s 0 3 1 2   
Stag90s 1 9 2 8 8 2 
Nonstag90s 0 11 2 10 11 1 
 














Stag60s       
Nonstag60s       
Stag70s 0.0% 20.0%     
Nonstag70s 100.0% 80.0%     
Stag80s 100.0% 85.0% 75.0% 88.9%   
Nonstag80s 0.0% 15.0% 25.0% 11.1%   
Stag90s 100.0% 45.0% 50.0% 44.4% 42.1% 66.7% 
Nonstag90s 0.0% 55.0% 50.0% 55.6% 57.9% 33.3% 
 
                                                 




VII.  APPENDIX I. Variables: description and sources 
 
Variable description Source 
Dummy for landlocked countries  Sachs and Warner data set 24  
 
GDP per capita in constant LCUs World Development Indicators 2002  
 
Real GDP per capita (1960) Levine and Renelt data set25, originally from 
SH 5.6 
Real GDP per capita (1970, 1980, 1990)  PWT 6.1 
Literacy rate (1960)  Levine and Renelt data set, originally from 
WBSI  
Growth of real per capita GDP (chain) (averages 
over different time periods)  
Calculation by authors.  
PWT 6.1 
Growth rate of domestic credit (average: 1960-1989) Levine and Renelt data set, originally from 
IMFIFS 
Investment share of GDP (average: 1960-1989) Levine and Renelt data set, originally from 
WBNA 
Investment share of GDP (averages over different 
time periods) 
PWT 6.1  
Growth of exports (1960-1989)  Levine and Renelt data set, originally from 
WBNA 
GEAPOPP: Difference between the growth rate of 
the economically active population (between ages 15 
and 65) and growth of total population.  
Sachs and Warner data set 
Share of exports of primary products in GNP in 
1970 
Sachs and Warner data set 
Dummy variable for primary commodity exporters 
according to criterion I  
A country is classified as a primary 
commodity exporter if its share of exports of 
primary products in GNP in 1970 is greater 
than the mean of the 172 countries in the 
Sachs and Warner dataset. Primary 
commodity exporters defined as such are: 
Algeria, Barbados, Bolivia, Cameroon, Costa 
Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq, 
Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Oman, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Venezuela, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
                                                 
24 Available at: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Economics/Growth/datasets/sachs/sachs.htm (accessed: March 25, 
2005) 
25 Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/ddlevren.htm (accessed: March 25, 2005) 
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Dummy variable for primary commodity exporters 
according to criterion II  
A country is classified as a primary 
commodity exporter if its share of exports of 
primary products in GNP in 1970 is greater 
by more than one standard deviation above 
the mean for the 172 countries in the Sachs 
and Warner data set. Primary commodity 
exporters defined as such are:  Fiji, Gabon, 
Gambia, Guyana, Iraq, Kuwait, Liberia, 
Malaysia, Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
Zambia  
Number of revolutions and coups per year  
(1960-1984)  
Levine and Renelt data set, originally from 
Barro (1991)  




Dummies for countries that are classified as 
stagnators using GDP per capita in constant 
LCUs  
Depth of stagnation Calculation by authors.  
 
Length of stagnation Calculation by authors. 
 
Number of stagnation spells Calculation by authors. 
 
Small island developing states UN classification26 
 
Public expenditure on health as percentage of GDP 
(1990-2000) 
World Development Indicators 2003 
Life expectancy, under five mortality, and infant 
mortality 
World Development Indicators 2003  
 
Notes on abbreviations: 
IMFIFS International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics  
SH 5.6 Summers and Heston version 5.6  
WBNA World Bank National Accounts  
WBSI World Bank Social Indicators  
PWT 6.1  The Penn World Tables version 6.1  
 
                                                 
26 Available at: http://www.sidsnet.org/sids_list.html (accessed: March 25, 2005)  
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II. APPENDIX II: List of Stagnation Spells by Country 
 
a. List of stagnators from main data set, available data, and stagnation characteristics 
 












1 Afghanistan 1960-1982 10 0.0735 1 1963-1972 
2 Algeria 1960-2001 10 0.1734 1 1986-1995 
3 Angola 1960-2001 5 0.4480 1 1990-1994 
4 Argentina 1960-2001 10 0.1525 1 1981-1990 
5 Bangladesh 1960-2001 3 0.0687 1 1971-1973 
6 Barbados 1960-2001 4 0.0741 1 1990-1993 
7 Benin 1960-2001 7 0.0622 1 1987-1993 
8 Bolivia 1960-2001 14 0.3152 2 1968-1971, 1979-1988 
9 Brazil 1960-2001 4 0.0405 1 1989-1992 
10 Burma (Myanmar) 1960-2001 5 0.1091 1 1986-1990 
11 Burundi 1960-2001 9 0.4394 1 1992-2000 
12 Cameroon 1960-2001 12 0.5552 2 1966-1968, 1987-1995 
13 Central African Republic 1960-2001 25 0.4470 2 1963-1967, 1978-1997 
14 Chad 1960-2001 21 0.5671 3 1963-1974, 1978-1981, 1992-1997 
15 Chile 1960-2001 4 0.0500 1 1973-1976 
16 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1960-2001 26 2.8002 1 1975-2000 
17 Congo, Rep 1960-2001 16 0.3633 1 1985-2000 
18 Costa Rica 1960-2001 7 0.0969 1 1980-1986 
19 Cote d'Ivoire 1960-2001 16 0.6109 1 1979-1994 
20 Ecuador 1960-2001 9 0.0269 1 1982-1990 
21 El Salvador 1960-2001 10 0.2687 1 1979-1988 
22 Ethiopia 1981-2001 7 0.1774 2 1984-1986, 1989-1992 
23 Fiji 1960-2001 6 0.0504 1 1982-1987 
24 Gabon 1960-2001 11 0.3867 1 1978-1988 
25 Gambia 1966-2001 13 0.1028 1 1985-1997 
26 Ghana 1960-2001 12 0.3518 1 1973-1984 
27 Greece 1960-2001 7 0.0205 1 1981-1987 
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28 Guatemala 1960-2001 7 0.1499 1 1981-1987 
29 Guinea-Bissau 1970-2001 5 0.0985 1 1977-1981 
30 Guyana 1960-2001 15 0.3169 1 1977-1991 
31 Haiti 1960-2001 26 0.7070 2 1963-1969, 1982-2000 
32 Honduras 1960-2001 15 0.0638 1 1981-1995 
33 Iceland 1960-2001 5 0.0352 1 1990-1994 
34 Iran 1974-2001 8 0.4413 2 1978-1981, 1985-1988 
35 Iraq 1960-1991 11 2.8995 1 1980-1990 
36 Jamaica 1960-2001 18 0.3465 2 1974-1986, 1996-2001 
37 Jordan 1975-2001 6 0.2835 1 1987-1992 
38 Kenya 1960-2001 14 0.0934 2 1982-1985, 1991-2000 
39 Kuwait 1962-2001 32 2.5352 2 1963-1989, 1996-2001 
40 Liberia 1960-2001 23 1.1273 1 1973-1995 
41 Madagascar 1960-2001 31 0.6607 2 1963-1966, 1972-1998 
42 Malawi 1960-2001 14 0.0873 1 1980-1993 
43 Mali 1967-2001 16 0.2006 1 1980-1995 
44 Mauritania 1960-2001 16 0.0886 1 1977-1992 
45 Mexico 1960-2001 6 0.0590 1 1983-1988 
46 Mozambique 1980-2001 3 0.0871 1 1983-1985 
47 New Zealand 1960-2001 9 0.0562 2 1976-1979, 1988-1992 
48 Nicaragua 1960-1998 18 1.3322 1 1977-1994 
49 Niger 1960-2001 28 1.2927 3 1966-1976, 1981-1985, 1989-2000 
50 Nigeria 1960-2001 18 0.3722 2 1978-1987, 1993-2001 
51 Panama 1960-2001 3 0.0815 1 1987-1989 
52 Papua New Guinea 1960-2001 21 0.2266 2 1975-1990, 1996-2000 
53 Paraguay 1960-2001 9 0.0798 2 1983-1987, 1997-2000 
54 Peru 1960-2001 8 0.2933 2 1982-1984, 1988-1992 
55 Philippines 1960-2001 4 0.1459 1 1983-1986 
56 Rwanda 1960-2001 16 0.4820 2 1963-1965, 1983-1995 
57 Saudi Arabia 1960-2001 17 0.6548 2 1981-1989, 1993-2001 
58 Senegal 1960-2001 23 0.2568 3 1963-1974, 1977-1981, 1989-1994 
59 Sierra Leone 1960-2001 17 0.2188 1 1984-2000 
60 Somalia 1960-1990 19 0.4098 2 1963-1970, 1973-1983 
61 South Africa 1960-2001 12 0.1697 1 1983-1994 
62 Sudan 1960-2001 17 0.1831 3 1963-1973, 1978-1980, 1983-1985 
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63 Suriname 1970-2001 10 0.2797 1 1979-1988 
64 Switzerland 1960-2001 5 0.0168 1 1992-1996 
65 Syria 1960-2001 8 0.0981 1 1983-1990 
66 Tanzania 1988-2001 4 0.0269 1 1992-1995 
67 Togo 1960-2001 14 0.3803 1 1981-1994 
68 Trinidad and Tobago 1960-2001 10 0.1535 1 1984-1993 
69 Uruguay 1960-2001 3 0.0924 1 1982-1984 
70 Venezuela 1960-2001 14 0.3286 2 1979-1985, 1994-2000 
71 Zambia 1960-2001 33 0.7991 1 1968-2000 
72 Zimbabwe 1960-2001 9 0.2116 2 1975-1978, 1983-1987 
 
b. List of transition countries, available data and stagnation characteristics 
 
#  COUNTRY YRS. DATA 
AVAILABLE 









1 Albania 1980-2001 1 4 0.3071 1 1989-1992 
2 Armenia 1990-2001 1 3 0.2077 1 1992-1994 
3 Belarus 1987-2001 1 5 0.3065 1 1991-1995 
4 Bulgaria 1980-2001 1 9 0.2354 1 1990-1998 
5 Croatia 1990-2001 1 3 0.1651 1 1991-1993 
6 Estonia 1980-2001 1 6 0.3077 1 1990-1994 
7 Georgia 1965-2001 1 10 2.3391 1 1986-1995 
8 Hungary 1960-2001 1 4 0.0994 1 1990-1993 
9 Kazakhstan 1989-2001 1 6 0.3444 1 1991-1996 
10 Kyrgyz Republic 1986-2001 1 5 0.6401 1 1991-1995 
11 Latvia 1965-2001 1 4 0.438 1 1991-1994 
12 Lithuania 1987-2001 1 5 0.4176 1 1991-1995 
13 Macedonia, FRY 1990-2001 1 6 0.1701 1 1991-1996 
14 Moldova 1980-2001 1 11 1.6361 1 1990-2000 
15 Romania 1975-2001 1 7 0.3773 1 1987-1993 
16 Russian Federation 1965-2001 1 9 0.5945 1 1990-1998 
17 Tajikistan 1985-2001 1 9 2.3749 1 1989-1997 
18 Turkmenistan 1987-2001 1 10 1.1265 1 1989-1998 
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19 Ukraine 1987-2001 1 9 1.2337 1 1990-1998 
20 Uzbekistan 1987-2001 1 6 0.2637 1 1991-1996 
21 China 1960-2001 0     
22 Czech Republic 1990-2001 0     
23 Poland 1990-2001 0     
24 Slovak Republic 1984-2001 0     
25 Slovenia 1990-2001 0     
26 Vietnam 1984-2001 0     
27 Azerbaijan 1993-2001 .     
28 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995-2001 .     
29 Yugoslavia 1995-2001 .     
 
 
c. List of small island developing states, available data and stagnation characteristics 
 
 













1 Bahamas, The 1960-2000 1 14 0.3696 2 1970-1976, 1990-1996 
2 Bahrain 1980-2001 1 6 0.1567 1 1981-1986 
3 Barbados 1960-2001 1 4 0.0741 1 1990-1993 
4 Comoros 1980-2001 1 15 0.2279 1 1986-2000 
5 Fiji 1960-2001 1 6 0.0508 1 1982-1987 
6 Haiti 1960-2001 1 26 0.707 2 1963-1969. 1982-2000 
7 Jamaica 1960-2001 1 18 0.3465 2 1974-1986, 1996-2001 
8 Kiribati 1970-2001 1 15 1.8207 2 1976-1981, 1985-1993 
9 Micronesia 1987-2001 1 6 0.1664 1 1995-2000 
10 Netherlands Antilles 1980-1985 1 6 0.0995 1 1980-1985 
11 Papua New Guinea 1960-2001 1 21 0.2266 2 1975-1990, 1996-2000 
12 Samoa 1978-2001 1 10 0.1375 2 1980-1983, 1989-1994 
13 Sao Tome and Principe 1986-2001 1 14 0.1131 1 1987-2001 
14 Solomon Islands  1967-2001 1 9 0.4304 2 1969-1973, 1997-2000 
15 Trinidad and Tobago 1960-2001 1 10 0.1509 1 1984-1993 
 41
16 Vanuatu 1979-2001 1 11 0.1552 2 1986-1989, 1994-2000 
17 Virgin Islands (U.S.) 1970-1989 1 4 0.0597 1 1974-1977 
18 Antigua and Barbuda 1977-2001 0     
19 Aruba 1987-1994 0     
20 Cape Verde 1981-2001 0     
21 Cyprus 1975-2000 0     
22 Dominica 1977-2001 0     
23 Dominican Republic 1960-2001 0     
24 Grenada 1977-2001 0     
25 Maldives 1984-2001 0     
26 Malta 1960-2001 0     
27 Marshall Islands 1999-2001 0     
28 Mauritius 1980-2001 0     
29 Seychelles 1960-2001 0     
30 Singapore 1960-2001 0     
31 St. Kitts and Nevis 1977-2001 0     
32 St. Lucia 1980-2001 0     
33 St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
1977-2001 0     
34 Tonga 1981-2001 0     
35 Cook Islands  . .     
36 Nauru . .     
37 Niue . .     
38 Palau     1999-2001     
39 Tokelau . .     
40 Tuvalu . .     
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